THE ALTERNATIVE-ACTION REQUIREMENT:
THE DERAILMENT OF SANTA FE
E.C.

LASHBROOKE, JR.*

In Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green I the United States Supreme
Court instructed federal courts to refrain from adjudicating intracorporate disputes involving claims of unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty
owed to the corporation or minority shareholders under the guise of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and rule lOb-5 3 in
the absence of any manipulation, deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure.4 Five of the courts of appeals have disregarded that notice

and have circumvented the Santa Fe decision by exploiting footnote
fourteen5 of that opinion. These courts use an alternative-action requirement as part of the test for materiality, although this requirement
should not exist in the post-Santa Fe era.
Part IV of the Santa Fe opinion 6 discusses the fourth element of
the Cort v. Ash7 test for implying a private civil cause of action for
damages: whether "the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated
to state law."" If the cause of action is one traditionally adjudicated by
state courts, Cort and Santa Fe indicate that no private cause of action
under federal securities laws should be implied. Footnote fourteen in
Santa Fe apparently abrogates Part IV of the opinion, for it permits a
federal cause of action in just such a case by making a cause of action
under state law a prerequisite to a federal claim.
By appending the alternative-action requirement to the materiality
standard, the courts of appeals have changed the question of material* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. B.A. 1967, M.A. 1968,
J.D. 1972, L.L.M. 1977, University of Texas at Austin.
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430 U.S. 462 (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). For the relevant text of this section, see note 14 infra.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). For the relevant text of this regulation, see note 23 infra.
430 U.S. at 476.
Id. at 474 n.14. See note 24 infra for the full text of the footnote. For a discussion of the

courts of appeals decisions, see notes 26-62 infra and accompanying text.

6. 430 U.S. at 477-80. Only six Justices joined in Part IV of the opinion. Justice Brennan
dissented, and Justices Stevens and Blackmun, concurring, refrained from joining Part IV.

7. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
8.Id. at 78.
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ity from an objective one 9 to a subjective one. Alternative-action, if a

requirement, is more properly an element of reliance.' 0 This article
examines the alternative-action requirement in light of the policy of
Santa Fe and discusses the requirement's effect on the standards for
materiality and reliance as elements of a cause of action for violation of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.

I.

FAIRNESS, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND
ALTERNATIVE ACTION

Historically federal courts have tended to give relief to shareholder
plaintiffs in derivative suits when they perceived unfairness, despite the
absence of fraud or bad faith.' Plaintiffs used section 10(b) and more

particularly rule lOb-5 as the primary vehicles to litigate fairness issues
in federal court. 12 In Santa Fe the Supreme Court supposedly put an
end to this practice.1 3 In its examination of the statutory language of
section 10(b),1 4 the Court limited causes of action under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 to practices that are "manipulative" in the technical
9. "The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, involving the
significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor." TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
10. The reliance issue has been defined as whether the particular plaintiff would have been
influenced to act differently had he known of the undisclosed information. List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
11. See, e.g., Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), aJft'd, 146
F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944). Barrett involved a reclassification of the stock of a solvent corporation,
the effect of which was to divest the preferred shareholders' cumulative rights to a 12 year dividend arrearage. Although Judge Leahy held that the reclassification was not unfair under Delaware law, he wrote at length on the issue of fairness in the hope that the reviewing court might
formulate an equitable standard for fairness. In another diversity case, Perlman v. Feldman, 219
F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,349 U.S. 952 (1955), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in a confusing opinion, held that the sale of a controlling block of stock at a premium was unfair
to the minority shareholders even in the absence of fraud or bad faith. The court ordered the
premium distributed on a pro rata basis among all the shareholders.
12. Good discussions of this development of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 appear in Jacobs,
Role of SecuritiesExchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of CorporateManagement, 59 CoRNELL L. REV. 27 (1973); Jennings, Federalizationof CorporationLaw: Part Way or.411the Way, 31
Bus. LAw. 991 (1976); Roantree, Continuing Development of Rule 10-b5 as a Means of Enforcing
the FiduciaryDuties of Directorsand Controlling Shareholders,34 U. PrTr. L. REV. 201 (1972);
Susman, Use oRule 10b-5 as a Remedyfor Minoriy Shareholdersof Close Corporations,22 Bus.
LAw. 1193 (1967).

13. See text accompanying notes 17-22 infra.
14. Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of any national
securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
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sense of artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead investors.1 5 "[I]nstances of corporate mismanagement in which the essence
of the complaint is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary" are beyond the scope of section 10(b).' 6 Therefore, when there has
been full disclosure of material facts, unfairness alone cannot sustain a
cause of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
Santa Fe involved the use by a corporation of the Delaware shortform merger statute 17 to freeze out the minority shareholders of a subsidiary, Kirby Lumber.' Under the Delaware statute, a corporation
owning ninety percent or more of the shares of another company can
acquire that company without the vote of the minority shareholders
simply by resolution of the board of directors. 19 The statute requires
only that the minority shareholders receive notice after the merger has
been effected; their only remedy after notice is appraisal.20 In Santa
Fe, full disclosure had been made, and the crux of the shareholder's
complaint was the unfairness of the merger terms, particularly the cash
value assigned to his Kirby stock. 21 The Court declined to find a federal cause of action and relegated the shareholder to state law
22
remedies.
Thus, SantaFe did not directly involve nondisclosure or misrepresentation under clause (b) of rule 10b-5. 23 Unfortunately, the Court
nonetheless chose to address the issue in a footnote. Footnote fourteen
clearly implies that if the minority shareholders could have enjoined
the merger under Delaware law, the corporation's failure to give advance notice of the merger would have constituted a "material nondisclosure" within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 24 The
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.

15. 430 U.S. at 476-77.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1980).
430 U.S. at 465.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1980); see 430 U.S. at 465.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1980).
430 U.S. at 466-67.
Id. at 478.
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), in relevant part states:

It shall be unlawful for any person...

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances

under which they were made, not misleading,
... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
24. The full text of footnote 14 is as follows:
In addition to their principal argument that the complaint alleges a fraud under
clauses (a) and (c) of Rule lOb-5, respondents also argue that the complaint alleges nondisclosure and misrepresentation in violation of clause (b) of the Rule. Their major
contention in this respect is that the majority shareholder's failure to give the minority
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courts of appeals have seized on the language of footnote fourteen to
in cases in which the plaintiff has an alteraddress questions of fairness
25
native-state law action.
The first of the alternative-action cases was SEC v. ParkianeHosiery Co. ,26 which involved nondisclosure in a premerger, going-private
proxy. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished this
case from SantaFe on three grounds. First, Parkianewas a Securities
Exchange Commission enforcement action for an injunction. 27 Second, the shareholders of Parklane had an alternative: they could have
sought and obtained injunctive relief in the state courts.28 Third, Parklane was a29 nondisclosure case whereas in Santa Fe there was full
disclosure.
The last of these distinctions is troublesome because Parklane involved nondisclosure of information that would have been relevant
only in a state court proceeding for an injunction.30 The information
was not relevant to the consummation of the merger because, as in
Santa Fe, the minority shareholders could not have altered the outcome of the shareholder vote.3 ' Moreover, Parkianeis contrary to the
court's own holding in Popkin v. Bishop,32 in which the court stated:
"Underlying questions of the wisdom of [mergers] or even their fairness
advance notice of the merger was a material nondisclosure, even though the Delaware
short-form merger statute does not require such notice. Brief for Respondents at 27. But
respondents do not indicate how they might have acted differently had they had prior
notice of the merger. Indeed, they accept the conclusion of both courts below that under
Delaware law they could not have enjoined the merger because an appraisal proceeding
is their sole remedy in the Delaware courts for any alleged unfairness inthe terms of the
merger. Thus the failure to give advance notice was not a material nondisclosure within
the meaning of the statute or the Rule. Cf. TSC Industries,Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438 (1976).
430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
The Court was merely trying to dispose of respondent's contention that the complaint also
alleged a rule l0b-5(b) violation in that failure to give minority shareholders advance notice of the
merger was a material nondisclosure. Indeed, Delaware law does not require notice of a shortform merger. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 253 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1980).
25. After Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), and Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), in which the Delaware Supreme Court reestablished
a cause of action based on fairness, the application of the alternative-action requirement would
compel a different result than the decision in Santa Fe.
26. 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
27. Id. at 1088.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The information in question was that the purpose for "going private" was to enable
the president and principal shareholder of Parklane to discharge his personal debts from the Parklane treasury. Id. at 1085. The suit for injunction in state court could have been based on lack of
a corporate purpose for the merger. Id. at 1088.
31. Id.
32. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). In Popkin the plaintiff alleged that the exchange ratio in the
proposed merger was unfair to the minority shareholders. He argued that this disparity would

Vol. 1981:963]

ALTERNATIVE-ACTION REQUIREMENT

967

become tangential at best to federal regulation." 33 In Popkin the court
found that the minority shareholders were not powerless, for they could
seek an injunction in state court even though they could not alter the
outcome of the shareholder vote on the merger.3 4 Because of the existence of the alternative-state law action, the court relegated the plaintiffs
to state court. Popkin was a precursor of the Santa Fe policy of relegating such cases to state court, which makes the Second Circuit's holding
in Parklane all the more puzzling.
The Second Circuit completed its circumvention of Santa Fe in
Goldberg v. Meridor.35 In Goldberg the parent corporation, when selling its assets to its subsidiary, failed to disclose certain financial information. This nondisclosure constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty to
the subsidiary. Goldberg, a minority shareholder of the subsidiary,
brought a derivative action to recover damages. Under New York
law36 a shareholder of a purchasing corporation has no vote or other
participation in such a transaction. The majority was of the opinion,
however, that New York law would have permitted Goldberg to seek
injunctive relief for breach of fiduciary duty.37 The majority, relying
on Parklane, found that the availability of injunctive relief in state
court made the misrepresented information material. 38 The effect of
this holding is that nondisclosure or misrepresentation of information
that amounts to a breach of fiduciary duty is a violation of section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 if an alternative-state law action is available.3 9 This
result confounds another Second Circuit case 4° decided one month
prior to Goldberg, in which Judge Mansfield stated: "[l]t is clear since
have constituted a violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 even if there had been full disclosure
because the minority shareholders could not prevent the merger.
33. Id. at 720.
34. Id.
35. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).

36. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 909 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
37. 567 F.2d at 219. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 720 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980).

38. 567 F.2d at 219-20. "Indeed, we have quite recently recognized that the availability of an
injunctive action under New York law constituted a sufficient basis for distinguishing the conclusion in the Green footnote with respect to materiality. . . ." Id. at 220.
39. The alternative-action requirement is one of two bases for the opinion. The other basis is
derived from Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906

(1969). The majority used a modified test for materiality combining Schoenbaum and TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976). Because only the subsidiary's directors had to decide

whether to purchase the parent's assets, the test for materiality was whether a substantial likelihood existed that if a reasonable director had known the facts he would have considered the
information important in making his decision. The majority held that a reasonable director would
have found the information important. 567 F.2d at 217-19. This rationale, although technically
complying with parts I through H of Santa Fe, conflicts with the policy underlying part IV of
relegating these cases to state courts.
40. Browing Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
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[Santa Fe] that no [fiduciary] duties are imposed by federal law upon
corporate directors and that a violation of any such state-law fiduciary
a
duties, including non-disclosureof conflicts of interest or unfairness of 41
court.
federal
in
action
of
cause
a
support"
not
will
conversion price,
In Wright v. Heizer Corp. 42 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit also endorsed the alternative-action requirement. Heizer,
which controlled the board of directors of International Digisonics
Corporation (IDC), obtained a pledge of IDC's corporate assets as security for certain loans.4 3 Under Delaware law44 no shareholder action
is required to pledge a corporation's assets. Wright, a minority shareholder, brought a derivative action based on section 10(b) and rule lOb5 for failure to disclose material facts concerning the transaction.
These facts were principally Heizer's degree of control over IDC and its
self-dealing or breach of fiduciary duty in pledging IDC corporate assets to itself as controlling shareholder. As in Goldberg, the minority
shareholder could have maintained a state suit on behalf of the corporation to enjoin Heizer from breaching its fiduciary duty to deal fairly
with the corporation. 45 The court distinguished this case from Santa
Fe, explaining: "If [the minority] shareholders would have been powerless to prevent the proposed self-dealing by the controlling shareholder even if they possessed knowledge of all the facts the failure to
disclose to them would presumably be immaterial and reliance could
not be shown." 46 In short, no cause of action existed under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 in the absence of an alternative-state law action.
However, the existence of an alternative-state law action for an injuncand
tion transformed immaterial information into material information
47
permitted a cause of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Other circuits soon followed the lead of the Courts of Appeals for
the Second and Seventh Circuits, using Goldberg and Wright as authority for the alternative-action requirement. The Court of Appeals for
48
the Ninth Circuit adopted the requirement in Penfold v. Meikle,
which involved a decision of the board of directors of a not-for-profit
41. Id. at 1084 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
42. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).

43. The plaintiff had complained about four previous transactions. The first three transactions occurred prior to Heizer's acquisition of control of the IDC board. The complaint about the
fourth transaction was the failure to disclose control in connection with a proposed amendment to
the IDC articles of incorporation. 560 F.2d at 244-45.
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 272 (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1980).
45. 560 F.2d at 250-51.
46. Id. at 250.
47. Id.

48. 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
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corporation to sell the corporation's assets to a third party in exchange
for securities. Under Idaho law a shareholder vote was not required, 49

but the board submitted the question to the shareholders for an advisory vote anyway. 50 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in failing to disclose conflicts of
interest of attorneys and directors and the personal liability of the directors for a corporate debt. Because the members could have filed a
derivative suit to enjoin the sale due to the alleged breaches of fiduciary
duty, the court concluded that the members were entitled to relief
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.5 1 Citing Goldberg and Wright, the
court held that "where shareholder approval is not required for a corporate act under state law, failure by directors and others to disclose
conflicts of interest or unfairness to shareholders regarding the transaction constitutes a violation of rule lOb-5." 52 The court stated that deception in violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 could exist precisely
because of the existence of an alternative-state law action.53 The
court's primary concern, consistent with Goldberg and Wright, was apparently that the transaction was grossly unfair to the members.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed suit in Alabama FarmBureau Mutual Casualty Co. v. American FidelityLife Insurance Co. ,54 a case involving a corporation's repurchase of its own stock.
Dutifully citing the Santa Fe requirement that a lOb-5 violation comprises deception or manipulation in connection with a breach of fiduciary duty,55 the Fifth Circuit found "'deception' in the defendants'
failure to disclose that the repurchase plan was to be carried out in a
manner that would artificially inflate the price of AMFI's stock...
and in their misrepresentation in the initial press release....-56 As in
Santa Fe, the minority shareholders were powerless to affect the repurchase plan which the board of directors had unanimously approved.
The now-familiar difference was the existence of a state law remedy:
"We hold that all that is required to establish lOb-5 liability is a showing that state law remedies were available and that the facts shown
make out a prima facie case for relief [under state law].''57 The court
49. IDAHO CODE § 30-145(2) (repealed 1979).

50. The membership did not approve the sale. 597 F.2d at 1282.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1292.
606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 77 (1981).
See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977).
606 F.2d at 613.

57. Id. at 614. For a discussion of plaintifi's burden of proof requirements, see text accompanying notes 64-74 infra.
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shareholder could
determined that under Florida law the minority 58
have sought injunctive relief to halt the repurchase.
Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc.59 involved an acquisition of
eighty percent of the stock of Catalyst Regeneration Services, Inc.
(CRS) by SCR, Inc., the predecessor of Catalyst Recovery, and a subsequent merger of CRS with a SCR subsidiary. The accomplishment of
the merger was guaranteed by the eighty percent block of CRS stock
held by SCR. The plaintiff could not have prevented the merger.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff alleged a violation of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 in that defendants failed to disclose information requested by the
plaintiff.60 Although an action for an injunction was not available
61
under Texas law absent fraud, an appraisal remedy was available.
Over a strong dissent by Judge Aldisert, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that "[w]here a misrepresentation or omission of
material information deprived a proper plaintiff minority shareholder
of an opportunity under state law to enjoin a merger, there is a cause of
action under rule lOb-5."' 62 The court therefore remanded the case to
the district court to determine if the injunction remedy was available to
the plaintiffs under Texas law and their reasonable probability of
success.
The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have circumvented the Supreme Court's holding in
SantaFe by deriving an alternative-action requirement from footnote
fourteen of that opinion. In the words of Judge Aldisert, dissenting in
Healey after discussing Goldberg, Wright, Penfold, and Alabama Farm
Bureau Mutual Casualty Co.: "We thus have a classic example of illicit
precedential inbreeding in which a number of decisions are cited to
of them provides a fair statesupport a legal precept, although none
63
ment of reasons for the conclusion."
II. BURDEN AND EXTENT OF PROOF

The language of footnote fourteen indicates that if an alternativeaction requirement exists, plaintiffs must affirmatively plead the alter58. 606 F.2d at 614.
59. 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980).

60. See id.at 644-45. Primarily, the plaintiffwanted information concerning the rationale for
the exchange rate and the identity of persons who fixed the exchange rate for the merger. Id. at

644 n.2.
61. See TEx. Bus. Corn,. ACT ANN. § 5.16.E (Vernon 1980).
62. 616 F.2d at 648.

63. Id. at 656.
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native-action." The courts of appeals disagree on what constitutes sufficient pleading and proof. The issue is whether merely alleging the
availability of an alternative-action is sufficient or whether a higher
standard, such as proof that plaintiff would have succeeded in state
court, is required.
Not all of the circuits have set a standard for pleading and proof.
In Goldberg the complaints did not even mention an alternative-action;65 the majority found sua sponte that a suit for injunction existed
under New York law.66 Judge Meskill, dissenting, would have placed
the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show a substantial likelihood
that he would have brought a state suit had the breach of fiduciary duty
been known.67 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has required
proof of the availability of a state law remedy and a reasonable basis
for state relief.6 8 The court stated that the plaintiff did not have to
prove that his state action would have been successful.6 9 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded Healey for findings on the
70
probability that the plaintiff would secure a state court injunction.
The plaintiff had to demonstrate that, assuming he had knowledge of
the undisclosed information, there was a reasonable probability of success in obtaining an injunction.7 1 Similarly, in Penfold the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit placed the burden upon the plaintiff to
show that he would have obtained an injunction or damages in state
72
court in excess of any appraisal remedy.
Certainly plaintiffs should be required to do more than merely allege that a state suit was available and that they would have sought that
remedy had they known of the breach of fiduciary duty or unfairness.
Otherwise, virtually all plaintiffs who are able to show that their states
permit injunctive or other relief in such cases will have established a
federal cause of action. If the Supreme Court truly intended to impose
an alternative-action requirement on a cause of action under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5, plaintiffs should be required to show a high
probability of success in state court given the policy underlying Santa
64. "But respondents do not indicate how they might have acted differently... ..." Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977) (emphasis added). See note 24 supra.
65. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d at 224.
66. Id. at 219-20.
67. Id. at 222 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
68. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602,
614 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 77 (1981).
69. Id.
70. 616 F.2d at 647-48.
71. Id.
72. Penfold v. Meilde, 597 F.2d at 1294.
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Fe of clearing the federal docket of these cases. Moreover, in most of
these alternative-action cases the plaintiff did resort to the state court

initially or concurrently but abandoned the suit in favor of the federal
action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 73 Federal courts have long
discouraged this kind of forum shopping. 74 Failure to impose a high
burden of proof is even more onerous in light of Santa Fe's underlying
rationale that the very existence of state law remedies, such as appraisal
rights and suits for breach of fiduciary duty, favor relegating these suits
to state court and militate against implying a federal cause of action
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The courts of appeals have turned

this rationale on its head by holding that it is the existence of those
state law remedies that give rise to the federal cause of action.
III.

MATERIALITY, RELIANCE, AND ALTERNATIVE ACTION

Since the inception of an implied civil cause of action for a violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, 75 the federal courts have been formulating a definition of materiality. 76 The test for materiality has
ranged from a realistic view 77 to a reasonable man standard 78 to a marketplace effects test.79 The Supreme Court cases that define materiality
involve section 14(b) 80 and rule 14a-9 8 1 rather than section 10(b) and
73. In Goldberg a parallel action on behalf of the corporation had been filed in a New York
State Supreme Court. 567 F.2d at 225. InAlabamaFarm Bureau MutualCasualty Co. the plaintiff had filed state law claims in Escambia County Circuit Court in Florida. 606 F.2d at 607. In
Healey the plaintiff filed an appraisal petition in Texas State Court which was dismissed without
prejudice. 616 F.2d at 645. In Penfold the plaintiffs voluntarily defaulted in a state court suit for
an injunction and permitted a judgment to be entered dismissing the suit. 597 F.2d at 1283-84.
74. See Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.5 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.dismissed, 409 U.S.
802 (1972) (under Sup. CT. R. 60).
75. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
76. See, eg., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,419 U.S.
873 (1974); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
77. Such a test is whether the fact is one "which would materially affect the judgment of the
other party to the transaction." Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa.
1947). The realistic view is the one preferred by Jennings and Marsh. See R. JENNINOS & H.
MARSH, SEcuarmrs REGULATION 954 (4th ed. 1977).

78. "'The basic test ofmateriality ... is whether a reasonableman would attach importance
...in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question."' SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969) (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965)).
79. In Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit formulated a test that measures the effect of the nondisclosure on the value of the
security in the market place. Id. at 642. This test eliminates both the "reasonable" and the actual
investor from the considerption of materiality.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981).
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rule lOb-5.8 2 Serious differences arose about whether the same standard should apply to section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 83 Moreover, it was
uncertain whether a uniform standard should apply within rule 10b-5
itself.8 4 Since the Supreme Court's decision in TSC Industries,Inc. v.
Northway, Inc. ,85 however, and its subsequent use of that standard in

Santa Fe8 6 the courts of appeals have adopted the TSC Industries stan-

dard for rule 10b-5. 8 7 The standard that the Supreme Court provided

in TSC Industries is an objective one: whether "there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the omitted
88
fact] important in deciding how to vote."1
The alternative-action requirement has modified this test for materiality. Material nondisclosures now include a corporation's failure to
inform shareholders, in timely fashion, of mergers or other transactions
82. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375 (1970). Materiality was not an issue in Mills; nevertheless, Justice Harlan explained:
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to be
"material," as it was found to be here, that determination itself indubitably embodies a
conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might have been considered
important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote.
to offset the voting process
This requirement that the defect have a sig'ficantpropenrity
is found in the express terms of Rule 14a-9, and it adequately serves the purpose of
that a cause of action cannot be established by proof of a defect so trivial, or so
ensuring
unrelated to the transaction for which approval is sought, that correction of the defect or
of liability
would
not further
the interests
protected
§ 14(a). as a definition of
Harlan'sbylanguage
on Justice
courts seized
Several
omitted).
384 (footnote
Id. atimposition
materiality. See, ag., Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 986 (D. Del.
1971), aff'd, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169, 173 (S.D. Iowa 1970);
1970). But see Gerstle v. GambleBerman v. Thomson, 314 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (N.D. Ill.
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973).
83. In Woolfv. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975), the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit applied a test for rule l0b-5 different from that for rule 14a-9, but the Supreme Court

remanded the case for reconsideration in light of TSC bIdes., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 944

(1976), and the court then adopted the TSC Industries standard. 546 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.), cea).
denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977).
denied, 419 U.S. 830
84. In Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), ceCrt.
(1974), a nondisclosure case, the court refused to adopt a different standard from that applied in a
false statement case and used the reasonable-man objective standard articulated by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cer. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See note 78supra. The court, however, articulated two different
criteria for materiality in a nondisclosure case by requiring that the situation be "essentially extraordinary in nature and.., reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price"
if disclosed. 401 F.2d at 848.
85. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
86. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 474 n.14. See note 24 supra.
87. See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1130 (5th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d 209, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Alton Box Board Co. v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1977); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d
236, 247-48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Woolf v. S.D. Cohen & Co., 546
F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977).
88. 426 U.S. at 449. See note 9 supra.
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that may be postponed or prevented by shareholder action in the state
courts. Citing TSC Industries, the Santa Fe Court concluded in footnote fourteen that because plaintiff Green could not have enjoined the
merger under Delaware law, failure to give him notice of the merger
was not a material nondisclosure.8 9 The footnote implies that if Green
had been able to enjoin the merger, the failure to give notice of the
merger would have been a material nondisclosure and Green would
have had a cause of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The
courts of appeals seized on this negative implication of footnote fourteen and modified the test for materiality in situations in which an alternative-state law action may be available.
The scope of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 took a quantum leap in
SEC v. ParkianeHosiery Co.90 when the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that information relevant to an attempt to enjoin a
breach of fiduciary duty is material. 91 Although not relevant to the
merger decision, information relevant in a state suit to enjoin a breach
of fiduciary duty or unfairness became material within the meaning of
federal securities law.
Citing Parkiane as precedent, the Second Circuit in Goldberg v.
Meridor92 extended its new test for materiality to private civil causes of
action.93 The availability of injunctive relief under New York law distinguished Goldberg's situation from that of the plaintiff in SantaFe.94
The Goldberg majority held that failure to disclose the parent corporation's breaches of fiduciary duty constituted material nondisclosure
within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 95 Although the

dissent disputed the majority's finding of materiality, it did not controvert the majority's reading of footnote fourteen. The dissent believed
that an alternative-state law action was not available; 96 in effect,
Goldberg was unanimous in its view that footnote fourteen expands the
materiality test.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expanded the scope
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 even further when, in Wright v. Heizer
Corp. ,97 it virtually equated unfairness with materiality. The Seventh
89. See note 24 supra.
90. 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
91. 558 F.2d at 1088.
92. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). See notes 35.41 supra and
accompanying text.
93. 567 F.2d at 220.
94. Id. at 220-21.
95. Id. at 221.
96. Id. at 223-24.
97. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
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Circuit reasoned that if the individual defendant had disclosed his
breaches of fiduciary duty, the minority shareholders could have
brought a state court derivative suit for injunctive relief. Under the
state's intrinsic-fairness standard, the defendant must prove that the
transaction was fair to the corporation. 98 If the defendant satisfies this
burden, the minority shareholders do not prevail in state court and,
therefore, the nondisclosure is not material in federal court. On the
other hand, if the defendant cannot meet this burden, the minority
shareholders prevail in state court and, therefore, the nondisclosure is
material in federal court. 99 Thus, the defendant's showing of fairness is
determinative on the issue of materiality.' °
Wright indicates that the Seventh Circuit has not abandoned its
determination to force issues of fairness into antifraud actions. The
result of this position is that materiality is measured on the basis of a
state-court "effects" test determined by the fairness of the merger terms
rather than by the objective reasonable-investor standard sanctioned by
the Court. The state court standard of fairness is essentially a determination of fair value, with little or no regard to any nontangible attributes of stock ownership. 101 Under the state court standard
misrepresented or nondisclosed information not directly concerning the
merger terms is not material if the terms are fair. As the Supreme
Court recognized in Mills v. ElectricAuto-Lite Co. ,102 a great number of
violations would go unredressed in cases properly before the federal
courts if this were the standard for materiality.103
InPenfold, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used a modification of the TSCIndustries objective standard' 04 as the standard for
materiality, substituting the state-alternative action for the investment
decision portion of the TSC Industries test.105 In Alabama Farm Bu98. E.g., Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 IMI.2d 268, 282-83, 166 N.E.2d 793, 800 (1960).

99. 560 F.2d at 250.
100. Id. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), vacatedandremanded,

396 U.S. 375 (1970). In this proxy case the Seventh Circuit equated fairness with reliance. 403
F.2d at 436. The Supreme Court rejected this position on policy grounds. 396 U.S. at 381-83.
101. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); David
J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 20, 29, 89 A.2d 862, 869, affid, 33 Del. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952). But see Singer

v. Magnovox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), in which the Delaware Supreme Court required that a
hearing be held to determine the entire fairness of the transaction, including not only fair value
but also intangibles. Id. at 977-78, 980.
102. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
103. Id. at 381-85.
104. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
105. The test was whether a reasonable minority shareholder "would have considered this

information in any decision whether or not to sue to block the sale." 597 F.2d at 1293.
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reau Mutual Casualty Co. the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
adopted the same test with slightly different language. 1' 6 Similarly, in
Healey the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted a standard
based on the information's relevance to the decision to seek state law
injunctive relief.107 In addition, the Healey court required a showing of
reasonable probability of success in state court to establish
08
materiality.1
Part of the underlying problem is the difficulty of determining materiality using an objective standard. Some commentators believe that
materiality can be determined only on a case-by-case basis, using a
facts-and-circumstances test.109 Many courts become confused and
speak of materiality in terms of the particular plaintiff, as a result, they
fail to distinguish between materiality and reliance. Materiality is determined by an objective standard, but the reliance issue is whether the
particular plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently had all
material facts been disclosed. 110 By appending the alternative-action
requirement to the materiality standard, the courts have confused materiality and reliance.
The problem is compounded in nondisclosure or omission cases in
which the establishment of materiality gives rise to a presumption of
reliance."' In such cases the question of reliance is necessarily hypothetical, involving a reasonable investor; but it is identical to the objective test for materiality. Therefore, in those cases the determination of
materiality establishes reliance. This conclusion does not mean, however, that reliance is eliminated as a requirement in a nondisclosure or
omission case. 112 In both Mills and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
106. "A reasonably prudent stockholder or disinterested director, in making an intelligent decision whether to take steps to stop the repurchase program, would certainly have considered it
significant ...." 606 F.2d at 614.
107. "mhe question is what information would be deemed to be material by the reasonable
investor who contemplates seeking an injunction against a merger." 616 F.2d at 647.
108. Id.
109. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcuRrEs REGULATION 955 (4th ed. 1977).
110. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
After drawing the distinction between materiality and reliance the List court confused them by
stating, "The proper test [of materiality] is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act
differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact." 340 F.2d at
463.
111. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972).
112. In Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840
(1975), Judge Waterman rejected plaintiffs argument that reliance was no longer a necessary element of a cause of action under rule lOb-5. See also Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510,
516 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d
221, 229 (8th Cir. 1970).
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States 113 the Supreme Court pondered the difficulty of proving reliance
in a nondisclosure case; the Court's concern demonstrates the impossi114
bility of eliminating reliance as a necessary element in such a case.
If a showing of materiality establishes a presumption of reliance in a
nondisclosure case, logic dictates that this presumption is rebuttable
and that affirmative proof of nonreliance should be admitted.11 5
The courts of appeals's approach to the alternative-action requirement is misguided due to a wayward footnote. The Supreme Court
articulated the proper materiality standard in TSC Industries and cited
it as applicable to lOb-5 cases in Santa Fe. The objective standard for
materiality must be restricted to information relevant only to an investment decision and not to an alternative-action decision. Otherwise
courts ignore the clear language of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, which
prohibits certain practices only "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security." This language has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to mean that a 10b-5 cause of action exists only for a particular
type of litigant. 116 The proper lOb-5 plaintiff is an investor who can
prove that his trading judgment in a specific instance of a purchase or
sale opportunity was affected due to the defendant's nondisclosure,
misrepresentation, or manipulation. If the plaintiff had no investment
decision to make, however, such as in a short-form merger, sale of assets, or other corporate decision not requiring shareholder participation, no cause of action exists under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 as
construed in Santa Fe. State law provides sufficient protection to such
plaintiffs, including appraisal remedies and injunctive relief or damages for breach of fiduciary duty or unfairness. If the nondisclosure is
material, and if it relates to an investment decision which the plaintiff
must make, forbearance by the plaintiff to seek alternative-state court
relief would establish reliance. The defendant would be free to establish *affrmativeproof of nonreliance based on the plaintiff's action or
nonaction.
113. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
114. Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840

(1975). See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972); Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970).
115. See Keiman v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1980); Arthur Young &
Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 829 (1977);
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974).
116. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,405 U.S. 918 (1972). See also Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975), ceri. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
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CONCLUSION

In Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green, the Supreme Court deliberately closed the federal courthouse doors to litigants whose primary
complaint is a breach of fiduciary duty or unfairness in a corporate
transaction. This policy decision was not made with callous disregard
for the rights of these litigants because state law remedies are available
to them. The courts of appeals have distorted the import of this policy.
Through a misapplication of footnote fourteen of Santa Fe, these
courts recognize a cause of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in
the very cases in which the Supreme Court would deny federal relief.
Under the alternative-action requirement established by the courts of
appeals a plaintiff must have an available state law remedy in order to
establish a lOb-5 action, but it is the existence of a state law remedy
that justifies the Supreme Court's relegation policy. The Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals have diametrically opposing views concerning the consequences of the availability of an alternative-state law
remedy.
Although any Supreme Court pronouncement is worthy of study
and cannot be summarily dismissed, it is incredible that the Supreme
Court intended to impose by way of a footnote a new materiality test
for plaintiffs who have an alternative-state court action. Yet that is
how the courts of appeals have chosen to interpret Santa Fe. This interpretation results in a dual standard of materiality, dependent on the
availability of an alternative-state action. Furthermore, abandonment
of the objective for the realistic standard of materiality confuses the
elements of materiality and reliance. Proof of forebearance from pursuit of the alternative-state law action is more properly an element of
reliance than of materiality under the objective standard.
Forebearance in these circumstances demonstrates the plaintiffs' assumption that corporations have made full disclosure of all material
information and have not breached their fiduciary duty. Failure to
pursue a state law action does not prove materiality. Supreme Court
review is imperative to check the spreading alternative-action requirement before the policy decision embodied in Santa Fe is further
emasculated.

